Abstract. The paper examines Safety Critical real-time Systems (SCS),
Introduction

Safety Critical Systems
Safety Critical real-time Systems (SCS) control special critical technology process or operation (SCTP) whose failures could lead to loss of lives, great human and material values and/or inadmissible damage to the environment. There are a lot of examples of SCTP and systems that govern them in transport [1] , aviation [2] , medicine, energy sector, military sphere, etc. The hardware, software and transmission tract of systems that process and transmit information are subjected to increased reliability and safety requirements. According to the SCTP nature, technical solutions are divided into two main groups.
The first group includes SCTP suitable to define the criterion of safe behavior after the failure of their control systems, a criterion to limit functionality or stop the controlled process [3] . These are undesirable but not hazardous outages of SCTP that create coercion to remove the failure and allow the process to continue. Such systems are said to have fail-safe behavior and their failures are safety failure [1] .
The second group includes such systems where the fail-safe behaviour is inappropriate. Due to the nature of the process in aviation, space transport, air traffic control, in life-supporting systems, etc., in most cases it is not possible to define the criterion of safety post-failure condition or behaviour. Each stopping of the process is inadmissible. Similar SCTP have to meet the requirements for availability or continuity of SCTP. These cases also refer to SCS but they are no longer fail-safe. There is a general criterion, according to which systems fall into this class. It is the admissibility of risk arising from a possible failure. The risk is standardized with safety standards that are universal, irrelevant to the technical solution and concern both examined groups.
Safety Standards
Safety is absence of inadmissible risk. Safety cannot be absolutely guaranteed, whatever if any measures are taken. There is always hazard. The problem is whether residual risk d Q is acceptable, admissible. Admissibility is determined by regulations [4] . The admissible value of hazard (Tolerable Hazard Rate) can be different and depends on the application of SCS. Therefore, it is spoken about levels of admissible hazard -Safety Integrity Level (SIL) [6, 7] . 
Technical Solutions
Once the quantitative standards of safety have been established, it is not relevant for the user how they have been achieved. Although it is not mandatory, in control of RTP of the first group it may turn appropriate to apply failsafe approach. The modern computer-based systems use modification of this principle (quazi fail-safe) as in figure 1 : a computer device F is assigned to operate as functional and another specific device K controls if it perform its functions correctly and without failures [8] . If it detects a failure, it switches off the controlled object CO, which is the determined safe condition. With control on processes of the second group, safety is achieved through high reliability. For this purpose Redundancy in different forms is used: dual channel structures, N-version programming, homogeneously or diversity reservation, TMR or more N M ∨ complex ones, ring network structures, etc. Special requirements are put also to the telecommunication systems, which must contain all necessary Safety related mechanisms [5] . This will be demonstrated with a simple example that for the needs of SCS it is inadmissible to apply usual structure «1 of 1» [8] .
With input vector X i (x 1 x 2 …, x w ) at the outputs of microprocessor μP (figure 2), a combination of logic signals Y(y 1 y 2 …, y v ) appears and these signals form a vector of length v bits. When the device is serviceable, the output vector is determined by the algorithm, internal memory and input data. The expected functional vector is X i ,i, a result of
With failures of the microprocessor, incorrect vectors can be obtained, which are distinguished from the real (functional) vector Y i by one, two or more digits (d= 1,2,3..) . Information in telecommunications is transferred with independent bits of the telegram and the code distance between vectors is a powerful tool to detect distortion and correct errors in the communication channel. Microprocessor processing is quite different. Heming distance d is not protection means. The probability of appearance of incorrect vectors does not depend on their Heming distances to the correct vector.
It is not possible to determine probability distribution p i (i) of incorrect vectors with any possible Fault and Error, which, moreover, can not be foreseen and given in advance. Without great detriment of accuracy for the model, equal probability distribution can be assumed, wherein probability to obtain the i -th vector from the incorrect vectors with length v is q i = 2 − v . It is the same for anyone else. This also applies to functional vector Y i , which is one of all 2 v vectors and arises after a failure with the same probability. All other incorrect vectors are with summed probability after failure to appear any incorrect vector (1) .
Let probability of any failure in the microprocessor is Q. Then probability Q i for post-failure appearance of the i -th
, and probability Q hazard for appearance of any incorrect vector is
The probability for incorrect output signal with vector length v = 8 will be (4) Q hazard = 0,996Q.
It can be seen that hazard Q hazard is approximately equal to the probability of failure, i.e. commensurable with unreliability. In a complex system containing thousands of components, even when they are of marginal low intensity of failures of order of λ = 1.10 −9 1/h, the best average time that can be achieved between failures MTBF is of 10 000 ÷ 100 000 h [10] or probability of failure Q = 1.10 −5 ÷ 1.10 −6 . These are values that are of magnitude several orders greater than the admissible one. The conclusion is that concept «1 of 1» is inapplicable in SCS.
Dual-channel Solutions
With all variety of conceptual and specific technical solutions mentioned above, there is a class of systems that have obtained the widest distribution: duel-channel structures [1, 7, 8] . Both structural units are constantly switched on "2 ∨ 2" scheme or the reserve one is switched on as standby "1+1". These systems are used in all areas of SCS application by world-famous companies such as Siemens, Bombardier, Thales, etc.
The dual-channel principle is a possible solution to the problems created by computer-based Safety Critical F-K structure in figure 1 . The most significant of them is recognition of failures that control device K must possess to identify the failure and promptly switch to the defined post failure rate. With absolute tests, the failure is identified slowly and technically inefficiently.
One of the most widely used tests is a relative test, wherein vector X applied to the input is processed in two information technologies and control channels, 1 and 2, and output vectors Y1 and Y2 of the same length are compared using principle "is -is". Their compliance is a measure of performance, where comparator gives OK to implement control on the object ( figure 3) . The control device K includes conditionally a comparator and the second channel.
Subject and Purpose of the Study
Dual-channel computer-based structures are well known and widely used but there are reliability properties and features that are not completely studied. They are the subject of study in this paper. The examinations are focused in particular to dual-channel computer-based systems for comparison of the type given in figure 3 .
The aim of the study is to establish analytical models for quantitative determination of reliability and safety of dual-channel SCS considering the effect of two factors: independence of failures in the channels and diversity of their software. Similar theoretical results can be found in [11, 12, 13] but they have been made with another formulation of the problem, relate only to some reliability indicators and do not take into account the effect of both factors. There is no quantitative assessment of effect " 2 2 " ∨ on safety and structural parameters influencing it.
Independence of Channels
Two Groups of Reasons for Undetected Failures
It is known that if two events A and B are independent, then the conditional probability of each, provided that the other one has occurred, is equal to its unconditional probability -the probability to happen event A does not depend on whether event B has or has not occurred, i.e. equality P(AB) = P (A).P(B) is fulfilled.
The flow of failures and recoveries in the systems of electronics, computers and telecommunications is recognized to be a Poisson flow [13, 15] . It has the property lack of after-effect, which means the independence of successively occurring failures. Any failure does not cause a next one and is not correlated with it. This independence is valid for the failures of individual channel but it spreads in both channels.
The hazard in Safety Critical dual-channel systems, consisting of removal of the non-functional and possibly hazardous signal, can be created by two groups of faults and errors:
1. Common to both channels causes for failuresCommon-Mode Failure (CMF) [11] that:
• are due to errors in the general specification, in manufacturing and operation, to environment effects such as electromagnetic interference, weather conditions, etc.;
• are contained in components common for both channels: power supply, input-output organization, common software, comparison, etc.
2. Simultaneous independent failures in both channels cause erroneous, but accidentally one the same vectors, due to which failures remain unidentified (accidentally non identificable -ANI.
The first group. CMF-causes are common for the two channels and affect both end results in the same way. Let take η η η η η -Fault, and the intensity of failures caused by them is λ η . They lead to unrecognisable by comparison failures.
The second group includes generally recognisable Fault. Let take α-Fault, and the intensity of failures caused by them is λ α . The safety of a dual channel system is based on the assumption that the channels are independent, CMF-causes are minimized and probability of unrecognized α-Fault is small enough.
Of course, the relationship between the main flow of failures λ 2 v 2 of both kinds and the reasons causing them are mediated by the input data and operation algorithms of channels.
Probability of Accidentally Undetected Failures
In order to appear erroneous but equivalent output vectors, they must be warped in the same manner in both channels and become one and the same post-failure vector Y j . The probability of this to happen with equally probable distribution of incorrect vectors is (5) .
Example. Let v = 3, and vectors be labeled in an ascending order of decimal numbers. 8 vector are obtained: After a failure in dual-channel system "2v2", sets of combinations of vectors in both channels can be formed according to matrix (6) .
At each moment only one vector is correct: functional vector Y i . Let it be No 3. In the matrix shown above combination 33 is marked, which means that both channels have generated this vector. The controlling effect with reliable operation is validated (OK) with this combination. However, OK at the output of comparator will be obtained not only in the 3 rd position. The comparator will be "misled" also in the j-th , k-th positions, etc., entirely in all other positions 2 v -1 with the same numbers of vectors. The probability to obtain any of them is . In this particular case they are 7. The probability of false OK will be (1 − q)q 2 , and probability of accidental non-identification Q ani will be
here Q α1 and Q α2 are probabilities of appearance of failures in channel 1 and channel 2. Equation (7) can be used to quantitatively evaluate the probability of accidental non-identification Q ani of simultaneous independent failures in both channels. 000 1 100 5 001 2 101 6 010 3 110 7 011 4 111 8
Influence of Independence of Failures on Reliability-Safety Features of a Dual-Channel System
Equivalent Reliability Scheme
System «2v2» is serial in reliability. If any of its elements fails, the system also fails. If channel 1 generates a flow with intensity λ α1 , and channel 2 generates a flow with intensity λ α2 , then the overall intensity is α-Fault ( figure 4a, 4b) (8) λ α = λ α1 + λ α2 . With channels with equal reliability, the intensity of failures in each one is (9) λ α1 = λ α2 = 0,5 λ α . The intensity of all failures is the sum of intensities of all the components of the pattern ( figure 4b, 4c) (10) λ 2 v 2 = λ α1 +λ α2 +λ η = λ α +λ η = λ αf +λ αε +λ ηf +λ ηε .
Function of Reliability R(t)
The dual channel computer-based system is reliable in two cases:
1. When there is no CMF and in both channels there are no recognisable failures by α-Fault;
2. When failures recognisable by comparison have accidentally caused functional instead of incorrect vectors.
In the first case the system is serviceable: no CMF (R η ) and each of the two channels with reliabilities R α1 and R α2 is serviceable:
In the above-quoted example (6) , this means that the functional combination 33 can also be obtained when failures are in one, and even in both channels. Since events are incompatible, the reliability of these components must be added together to give a total reliability for the second case.
In the second case in one of the two channels or in both channels there is α-Fault but by chance they have generated a functional vector, Y i . In the example mentioned above (6) it means that functional combination 33 can be obtained also with failures in on of the channels and even in both channels. Since the events are incompatible, these components of reliability have to be summed to obtain the total reliability for the second case (11) . . Furthermore, the first case and the second one are incompatible, and therefore the sought probability R 2 v 2 for the dual channel system "2 ∨ 2" to be serviceable is modelled with their sum, which after processing is reduced to
With equal reliability in the two channels and homogeneous Poisson process with constant event rate (λ = const), the dual channel structure reliability is obtained in the form 
Probability of Hazard Failure Q h (t)
The logic, connected with the two reasons for an unidentified and possibly hazard failure (p. 2.1), is shown graphically in figure 5 .
CMF-failure events and accidentally unrecognised α -failure, unlike the events in p. 3.2 are compatible and their total intensity is not the sum of their partial intensities. The Boolean function of non-identification F ni , when a failure is not logically detected, is To model the probability of non-identification of failures, logical-probabilistic transition from (14) has to be implemented. Having applied the theorem of De Morgan, an unrepeatable Boolean function in basis "conjunction-nega-
, which is appropriate for complete substitution, is obtained. Applying the rules of logical-probabilistic transitions, for the probability to not detect failures, it can be obtained
, where Qni 2v2 is the probability sought for an unidentified failure, Q η -probability for unrecognisable CMF failure, and Q ani -probability an accidentally unidentified recognisable failure. Substituting from (7) to (15) , for the probability to not recognize a failure is
With exponential distribution and channels equally reliable, the probability of an unidentified failure is 
Probability of a Safety Failure
Safety failures are created only by α-Fault, CMF failures do not affect Safety status. The failure is recognized, and OK signal is hung in two cases.
In the first case, one of the channels operates and the other has failed, or vice versa, but the output vector of the failed one is different from the correct vector of the channel operating. Taking into account that the events are incompatible and the failed channel can generate any of i 2 v -1 incorrect vectors, the probability of this is a sum of probabilities, i.e. 
In the second case both channels have failed and generate different output signals (with different numbers, see (6)). The probability of this is the sum of probabilities for all such cases
Since the two cases are mutually exclusive, then the probability of safety failure of the dual-channel structure is the sum of their probabilities
With exponential distribution and equality of reliabilities in both channels, the probability of safety failure failures is 
Channel Diversity Effect on Dual-Channel System Reliability and Safety Features
Diversity
Dual-channel structure channels can be homogeneous and diversity.
Diversity is a method of solving the problem (logical, technical, etc.) in two different ways (A and B) based on the same input data. As it is known, difference may consist in divergence of approach and method of problem solving, in implementation of various principles or various company technologies. Software diversity is most widely spread. The difference may occur in algorithms, programming languages, data presentation (inverse, reverse), etc. It is usually achieved through diversity and independence of programming teams solving both A and B versions of the problem. If the difference is in methods and algorithms, it is said to be artificial (forced) diversity, which with coding can be achieved by one and the same team.
Diversity is the most effective tool for detecting errors. Its effectiveness is due to the properties of errors unlike the properties of faults. When the causes for failures are hardware faults, failures are independent of whether the channels are homogeneous or diversity. They have their own, specific to each α-Fault. No such dependence exists with errors. Errors (with design, construction, programming, documentation, technology, etc.) are systematic, «by birth», one and the same for all produced series. If both channels according to copies of one and the same program, A ≡ B errors of the only software lead to one and the same incorrect results and failures remain unrecognisable. When the channels operate on various programs, A ≠ B errors are detected because they are not one and the same, are of accidental nature and on random locations in software, due to which lead to inappropriate results. In deep diversity channels there is no dependence of errors missing (λ η ≈ 0) and they can be examined as α − Fault as hardware faults.
Schemes of Diversity Implementations
The scheme, which is used to implemented diversity, can be different, e.g.:
1. 2H+2S: two channels 1 and 2 operate in parallel or in sequence over time under various programs. A and B can be separate and independent processing, transfers, records, etc. but "are supplied" with the same input information. Hardware faults, pulse interference and software errors are recognisable. This scheme is the most efficient but very inefficient in terms of resources.
2. 2H+1S: two hardware channels operate in parallel on one and the same program, A = C. Hardware failures are recognisable but software errors are CMF-Fault and cannot be identified. When they operate synchronously and in phase, no pulse interference are recognisable as well.
3. 1H+2S: two different programs are performed by one computer in sequence. Although created by independent teams, if the programs prove to be very close by the way of using hardware, the same effect of failure on processing and the resulting output vectors can be obtained. As a result, relevant but incorrect results can be obtained and failures will remain unrecognisable by comparison.
Equivalent Scheme of Diversity System Reliability
Failures can be due to both hardware faults f and software errors ε -Error. Hence reliability of any 2H+2S system depends on both α-Fault and η-Fault. In the present context there is a system consistent in reliability ( figure 4c) . Each of α, η, f ,ε -failures is independent from the others. No matter where failures occur, in channels 1 or 2, they result in non-serviceability of the entire system. The total intensity of failures is the sum of intensities of different kinds of failures:
where λ α -intensity of α -failures recognisable by comparison of output results; λ αf -intensity of α -failures due to faults; λ αε -intensity of α -failures due to errors; λ η -intensity of η -failures unrecognisable by comparison;
λ ηf -intensity of η -failures due to general faults; λ ηε -intensity of η -failures due to general errors. Two separate, partial metrics for independence of failures will be introduced due to two reasons:
• For hardware faults f
In this substitution the probability of an unidentified failure (17) takes the form i.e. all system failures remain unidentified but only one of them, the one that leads to a functional vector, is not potentially hazard.
• When all failures are independent ϕ → 1 and Δ → 1, probability of non-identification is minimal 1/h, t = 1.10 4 h and v = 8 bits probability of hazard failure in the dualchannel system will be reduced ξ max = 1 045 times.
Case Studies
System 2H+2S. In individual hardware channels ϕ ≈ 1, and in the two parallel channels different, independent programs are used. It is why software diversity is deep and error recognition is very great Δ ≈ 1:
The improvement of safety is greatest and may be calculated by (30).
System 2H+1S. It is most often that one and the same software is used in both synchronously working channels and errors lead to unrecognisable incorrect output results. There is no software diversity, failures due to hardware faults are η and α and recognition in regard to errors is practically zero Δ ≈ 0
System 1H+2S. A dual-channel system of one hardware channel with two different programs has metrics for hardware independence in interval ϕ = 0 ÷1, at that being closer to the desired 1 as much as more differently the two separate programs use hardware. The identification of failures is also in the same interval and the cause of failures is errors ε. The formula for calculating is (26), the same as in 2H+2S, but with the corresponding data of channels.
Models for Recoverable Systems
The reliability function R(t) of non-recoverable systems (or recoverable but until to the first failure) where operation time until failure t is included and coefficient of
of recoverable systems, which is dependent on service restoration rate μ, are similar probabilistic quantities. These quantities are used to measure the probability of object availability. Using this analogy and summing up the results, formal models of reliability and safety indicators are given in the table.
Formulas for determining reliability and safety indicators
Unrecoverable systems
Recoverable systems Reliability and availability 
Examination on Independence and Diversity Effects
To establish the effect of failure independence and diversity of channels, calculations for the schemes examined in p. 5.2 have been carried out with different values of parameters involved. Here, because of the limited place, the results are given only for one of the most common schemes: 2H + 1S. Considering that perfection of the software can be achieved and demonstrated for relatively simple problems using the methods of error-free programming [2] , it is assumed that software CMF causes have been reduced to zero (λ ε = 0). It is only failures due to intensity faults λ f that remain. Under these constraints according to (32) the probability of non-identifications of failures in dual-the channel The results of function K ni 2 v 2 (λ, ϕ) are shown in figure 6 . It can be seen that the probability of non-identification of failures grows with their intensity reaching the highest values with ϕ = 0, when the structure is reduced to a single channel one. The probability K ni 2 v 2 sharply decreases with increasing the independence of channels. This process is particularly sensitive with ϕ → 1. This sensitivity is even better illustrated in figure 7 .
In particular, attention should be paid to comparison of a dual-channel system with a single-channel one «1 v 1» with various values of influencing factors. Using equation (33) and applying it to the case, the effect on safety is found is seen that independence of failures has particularly strong effect on highly-reliable systems (λ f t → 0).
The greater the intensity of failures and/or the older system becomes, the smoller is the effect of independence of channels. Thus with 8 bits, ϕ → 1 and λ f → 0 it is reached to 154 202 times smaller probability of potentially hazard failure and after aging improvement sharply declines. But even with values of interest in practice λ f = 0,1[1/h] and ϕ = 0,9, ratio ξ = 4942 times remains impressive. Figure 8 shows dependency K ni 2 v 2 (v, ϕ) with μ = 1. [1/h] . From the graphs it is seen that with increasing the length of vectors, probability of non-identification sharply decreases. The stronger this effect is, the bigger is independence of channels.
From the results shown above it can be concluded that all design and technological measures have to be taken to reduce CMF-component to zero. As for the hardware solutions, this is largely achievable task. The situation related to the problem of software is different. Errors ε in complex software systems are a source of CMF that can be overcome with small resources one of which is diversity Δ.
Conclusion
This study is an attempt to model reliability and safety performance of a class of wide-spread Safety Critical Computer Systems. It has become clear what and how reliability and probability of recognised and unrecognised failures depend on. It has been confirmed that independence of the two channels in dual-channel structures is crucial for iden-information technologies and control tification of failures and hence for safety operation of systems. The contribution of this paper is the quantitative models used to evaluate these features. They show that the positive effect on safety of dual-channel nature is extremely strong, near the absolute independence of channels. When reliability parameters of specific systems have been studied by established formulas, their indicators can be calculated to determine compliance with safety standards (i.e. 1.3). Using these models and results of examinations carried out, it is possible to improve technical solutions or propose new ones with higher reliability and safety.
